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INTRODUCTION
efore entering politics, Joseph Goebbels tried his hand at
literature. As perhaps is not uncommon among young
politicians, Goebbels wrote a novel in his mid-twenties.1 In-
stead of allowing his book to gather dust in a drawer some-
where, Goebbels published his book in 1929 with the title Mi-
chael: A German Destiny in Diary Pages. The novel was subse-
quently published by the central press of the National Socialist
party and went through seventeen printings by 1942. 2 The
book, which was written before Goebbels ascended to his role
as chief propagandist for the Nazi party, includes signals of po-
litical positions which were yet to come to fruition:
The mission of women is to be beautiful and to bring children
into the world. This is not at all as rude and unmodern as it
sounds. The female bird pretties herself for her mate and
hatches the eggs for him. In exchange, the mate takes care of
gathering the food, and stands guard and wards off the ene-
my.3
Goebbels’ book was published without the ominous-seeming
subtitle in the United States.4 But the stilted, irate view of
“those loud women who mix themselves up in any- and every-
thing, without understanding any of it” did presage what would
become an important aspect of Nazi government and philoso-
phy.5 Women’s highest calling would be to bear children; men
would protect those children. Women should not “mix them-
selves up” in the public world; their own, private sphere was
the foundation of everything else.6
In the current era of equal opportunity, statements like
Goebbels’ seem antiquated and far removed from the concerns
1. Tom Clark, The Nazi Wrote a Novel, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1987,
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-10-25/books/bk-16144_1_joseph-goebbels.
2. JOSEPH GOEBBELS, MICHAEL: EIN DEUTSCHES SCHICKSAL IN
TAGEBUCHBLÄTTERN (1942), available at https://archive.org/details/Michael-
einDeutschesSchicksalInTagebuchblaettern.
3. Claudia Koonz, The Competition for a Women’s Lebensraum, 1928–
1934, in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI
GERMANY 199, 210 (Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman & Marion Kaplan
eds., 1984) (quoting Goebbels).
4. Clark, supra note 1.
5. GOEBBELS, supra note 2, at 42.
6. See id. at 123 (“Heimat! Erde! Mutter!”)(trans.: “Home! Earth! Moth-
er!”).
B
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of contemporary women. Yet the concept of women’s role in so-
ciety that he expounded was at the core of the Nazi-racial state
and served as the rationale for the development of an elabo-
rate, totalitarian system of monitoring, censorship, incentives,
and punishment. In the United States, constitutional privacy
law is understood to protect against the growth of a “police
state”—to prevent precisely this type of abuse by state institu-
tions.7 However, scholarly accounts claim that European priva-
cy law, which emerged from a background of totalitarian re-
pression, is unlike American law. It focuses not on liberty, but
instead dignity.8 Rather than responding to a legacy of totali-
tarian rule, European privacy law is said to have emerged from
a nineteenth-century tradition of honor and dueling that was
primarily focused on reputational concerns—on one’s privacy
vis-à-vis one’s fellow citizens, not the state.9 This divergence
has given rise to “two different cultures of privacy,” one orient-
ed toward the state and one oriented toward society.10
In the wake of revelations that the American intelligence
community has secretly collected data on millions of people,
including political leaders abroad, our understanding of the
similarities—and differences—between European and Ameri-
can privacy law has taken on new significance.11 This Article
claims that contemporary European norms on privacy emerged
against a background of unprecedented state surveillance and
intrusion on “private life” during the Third Reich. Human
7. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886) (recalling
that the basis for the Fourth Amendment was the Framers’ opposition to rev-
enue officers’ use of writs of assistance, “empowering them, in their discre-
tion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pro-
nounced ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found
in an English law book’”).
8. James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of Privacy, 113 YALE L.J.
1151, 1163 (2004).
9. Id. at 1166–67.
10. Id. at 1160–61.
11. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Min-
ing Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-
mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-
program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
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rights are usually conceived of as having developed as a result
of the Holocaust and Nazi abuses.12 The human right to priva-
cy, as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights
and German Basic Law, is no different. Yet a close examination
of the development of European privacy law in the immediate
post-World War II context reveals that legislators struggled to
respond to a particular type of privacy violation: an infringe-
ment of the right to privacy in the home. Surprisingly, the gov-
ernment’s legacy of misuse of personal information, infiltration
of dissident-political groups, or interception of communications
did not take center stage. Instead, the framers of these post-
war privacy laws were concerned about securing the right—a
man’s right—to run one’s family as he wished, in opposition to
Nazi policies that placed the government squarely in charge of
reproduction, family, and marriage.13
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that family pol-
icy under the Third Reich represented a departure from histor-
ical norms that protected the “private sphere” from government
intervention. Nazi policy toward Aryan mothers and toward
“undesirable elements” required unprecedented interference
with the traditionally “private” realm of marriage, family, and
reproduction. Part II analyzes the legislative history of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights as well as the German
Basic Law to support the claim that the framers of these key
post-war legal instruments were responding to a legacy of un-
precedented intrusion on the historically private sphere in ad-
dressing privacy protections. Scholarly accounts that attribute
European privacy law to nineteenth-century traditions of “hon-
or” undervalue the more recent history that underpins what
this Article terms “public privacy law.” Part III illustrates that
in three discrete and seemingly unrelated areas of contempo-
rary debate—conflict over law governing commercial enterpris-
es’ use of consumer data, citation of foreign law, and counter-
terrorism surveillance—the conception that U.S. and European
norms are in conflict is still very much alive. The Article con-
12. See, e.g., SABINE C. CAREY, MARK GIBNEY, & STEVEN C. POE, THE
POLITICS OFHUMAN RIGHTS: THEQUEST FORDIGNITY (2010).
13. See generally CLAUDIA KOONZ, MOTHERS IN THE FATHERLAND: WOMEN,
THE FAMILY, AND NAZI POLITICS (1987); Gisela Block, Racism and Sexism in
Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory Sterilization, and the State, in
WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY 271,
273 (Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman & Marion Kaplan eds., 1984).
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cludes with observations on how anti-authoritarian and anti-
totalitarian privacy norms might be emerging in the contempo-
rary era.
I. PRIVACY AND THE FAMILY IN THE THIRD REICH
As a result of the Industrial Revolution, World War I, and the
emergence of the Weimar Republic, women’s public status in
Germany grew, albeit shakily, from the late nineteenth century
until 1933.14 It was not until 1908 that women could join politi-
cal parties or receive university degrees.15 During the First
World War, women entered the economy as laborers; when the
Kaiser surrendered and the Republic emerged in 1918, women
received the right to vote.16 These advances were short-lived:
while the Nazis embraced a “right to join in the common labor
of the community and a right to recognition, respect, and hon-
or,” women were again almost entirely excluded from public
life.17 Weimar-era progress, much of which was overstated to
begin with,18 was quickly rolled back in favor of a return to do-
mesticity and to the “private sphere.” Superficially, perhaps
this did amount to an increase in the protection of privacy un-
der the Third Reich, in the sense that “private life” was again
firmly separated from public and protected by the law of repu-
tation.19 But in fact, private life was also the subject of increas-
ingly totalitarian intervention by the state.
A central objective of the Third Reich was to accomplish the
renewal of German society by eliminating racially problematic
elements.20 As Marxist historian Timothy Mason put it, “The
purity of the blood, the numerical power, the vigour of the race
14. KOONZ, supra note 13, at 25–26.
15. Id. at 25.
16. Nina Seppälä, Women and the Vote in Western Europe, in VOTER
TURNOUT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1945: A REGIONAL REPORT 34 (Rafael
López Pintor & Maria Gratschew eds., 2004),
http://www.idea.int/publications/voter_turnout_weurope/.
17. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1188.
18. Charu Gupta, Politics of Gender: Women in Nazi Germany, 26 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 40, 42 (1991).
19. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1188. See also Gupta, supra note 18, at 40
(describing the “extreme separation of spheres for men and women” instanti-
ated under the Third Reich).
20. See generally IAN KERSHAW, HITLER, THE GERMANS, AND THE FINAL
SOLUTION (2009) (analyzing the history and historiography of the Final Solu-
tion).
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were ideological goals of such high priority that all women’s
activities other than breeding were relegated in party rhetoric
to secondary significance.”21 Germany’s declining birth rate at
the time that Hitler came to power made it all the more imper-
ative for women to reproduce.22 Thus, as historian Charu Gup-
ta has pointed out, “There was in fact a close connection be-
tween Nazi pro-natalism for ‘desirable’ births and its anti-
natalism for ‘undesirable’ ones.”23 For Aryan women, Nazi ide-
ology emphasized the proper role in the private sphere—
heroicizing motherhood and domestic life, while undermining,
if not denying outright, women’s abilities to contribute to public
life.24 Jewish women, on the other hand, were overwhelmingly
the target of forced sterilization, forced labor, and genocide.25
These policies bear on privacy in two distinct ways. First,
Nazi policies toward family, motherhood, and reproduction rep-
licated conceptual distinctions between “public” and “private”
that reaffirmed the value of the home as a separate “sphere.”26
Second, although this development nominally suggests that
“domestic” concerns would be subject to less state intervention
than concerns in the “public” sphere,27 the “private” sphere to
which women were relegated was actually the target of unprec-
21. Tim Mason, Women in Germany, 1925-1940: Family, Welfare and
Work. Part I, 1 HIST. WORKSHOP 74, 88 (1976).
22. See Gisela Block, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood,
Compulsory Sterilization, and the State, 8 SIGNS 400, 405 (1983) (pointing out
that the decline in the German birthrate reached “an international low point”
in 1932 and was attributed partly to a “birth-strike” by women).
23. Gupta, supra note 18, at 40.
24. Koonz, supra note 3, at 220.
25. See Gisela Block, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood,
Compulsory Sterilization, and the State, in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY:
WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY 271, 273 (Renate Bridenthal, Atina
Grossman & Marion Kaplan eds., 1984) (“[T]he Nazis were by no means
simply interested in raising the number of childbearing women. They were
just as bent on excluding many women from bearing and rearing children—
and men from begetting them—with sterilization as their principal deter-
rent.”).
26. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (discuss-
ing the distinction between public and private).
27. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 255, 257 (2006) (tracing the “favored treatment” homes receive
in privacy law and other substantive areas of law).
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edented regulation and surveillance.28 Thus, despite the Nazi
discourse around a “traditional” notion of womanhood and fam-
ily life, the highly policed reproductive policies in the Third
Reich actually represented a departure from historical norms
about how the “private” sphere was governed.
A. Kinder, Küche, Kirche
Nazi policy and ideology on women, while by no means uni-
form,29 advocated for an enhanced role for Aryan women in the
home and a diminished role in the public sphere. While in the
run-up to Nazi rule, women’s movements flourished, the com-
ing of Hitler presaged a threat to “women’s claim to public sta-
tus altogether.”30 Thus, Goebbels’s statement that “a mother
who is not everything to her children: friend, teacher, confi-
dante, source of joy and constant pride, one who motivates, one
who protects, one who accuses, pardons, judges and forgives—
that mother has clearly failed her profession.”31 Although the
Nazis’ traditionalist notions of femininity meant that women
were increasingly forced out of the public sphere, concepts of
womanhood and motherhood nonetheless played an important
role in public-facing Nazi propaganda and racial policy. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, the Nazi movement embraced a concep-
tion of women as the safeguard of a racially pure state. As one
contemporary commentator put it, “If women sink, the entire
nation sinks; and if the whole Volk declines, then women bear
the largest guilt.”32 As a result, while women were ideally to be
taken out of the public sphere, “the reproductive aspect of
women’s unwaged housework,”33 as historian Gisela Bock put
it, was very much the subject of concern, regulation, and legis-
lation.
28. See, e.g., Christiane Eifert, Coming to Terms with the State: Maternal-
ist Politics and the Development of the Welfare State in Weimar Germany, 30
CENT. EUR. HIST. 25, 47 (1997) (arguing that even political parties that were
relatively committed to the feminist cause in Weimar Germany sought to
preserve traditional gender roles in the home and insulate “privacy” within
the home as “the natural right of every man”).
29. See generally Leila Rupp, Mother of the “Volk”: The Image of Women in
Nazi Ideology, 3 SIGNS 362 (1977).
30. Koonz, supra note 3, at 220.
31. GOEBBELS, supra note 2, at 12 (trans. by author).
32. Koonz, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting Guida Diehl).
33. Block, supra note 22, at 271.
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The racial necessity of reproduction rendered the Nazi con-
cept of family “not a defense against public invasion as much as
the gateway to intervention . . . . Government-sponsored family
protection programs hastened the destruction of individualism
and privacy.”34 A primary example of this type of destruction
was the “marriage loan” program, designed to encourage mar-
riage and reproduction among racially “fit” people.35 As part of
the Law to Reduce Unemployment, which took effect on June 1,
1933, the regime attempted to “transfer” women out of industry
and into “domestic” work.36 As a complementary initiative, the
regime began to offer “marriage loans” to couples if the wife
had previously been employed but stopped working upon get-
ting married.37 The marriage loan program reflected the Nazi
emphasis on the institutions of marriage and family as key ve-
hicles for increasing the racially healthy population and achiev-
ing racial goals.38 The program depended on a tax levied upon
“single” people—including childless widows and widowers—in
order to raise money for unions that might produce children.39
Additionally, it actively discouraged marriage with someone
who suffered from a “hereditary mental or physical ailment”
because the marriage would not be “in the interest of the folk-
national community.”40
Beyond the interests of incentivizing “desirable” procreation,
the marriage loan program was equally premised on ideological
consistency and racial purity. A supplementary decree to the
34. KOONZ, supra note 13, at 180.
35. Rupp, supra note 29, at 371.
36. RGBL. I, 326 (1933).
37. RGBL. I, 326–27 (1933).
38. For an illustration of this, see Hanna Rees, Frauenarbeit in der NS-
Volkswohlfahrt (1938), reprinted in FRAUEN IM DEUTSCHEN FASCHISMUS 132
(Annette Kuhn ed., 1987) (“Der Nationalsozialismus, der in der Lösung der
sozialen Probleme nicht nur die Voraussetzung jedes nationalen Strebens
sieht, sondern im Hochziel eines erneuerten Volkes das sozialistische und das
nationale Ideal in eines verschmilzt—, musste aus seinem eigenen Gesetz
heraus sich allen mütterlichen Kräften verbünden und die natürlichen
Lebensträgerinnen und –pflegerinnen zur Mitarbeit verpflichten.”).
39. RGBL. I, 327 § 5 (1933).
40. RGBL. I, 377 § 1 (1933) (“Ehestandsdarlehen werden nicht gewährt: . .
. (d) wenn einer der beiden Ehegatten an vererblichen geistigen oder
körperlichen Gebrechen leidet, die seine Verheiratung nicht als im Interesse
der Volksgemeinschaft liegend erscheinen lassen”). The translation of Volks-
gemeinschaft as “folk-national” is borrowed from Ian Kershaw, who uses it in
HITLER, THEGERMANS, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION (2008).
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initial program provided that marriage loans were not to be
given to those who did not possess citizenship rights, nor to
those whose political loyalty was “assumed” to be questiona-
ble.41 The question of political loyalty was “determined through
questioning of the applicant himself and in addition of reliable
persons who have knowledge of the intimate circumstances of
the applicant, such as for example welfare officers, clergy, reli-
able neighbors.”42
The marriage loan program was only one of the ways in
which German citizens were not only subject to policing by the
state, but also by each other. The Gestapo, the secret police or-
ganization responsible for investigating political violations, was
leanly staffed and often relied on German citizens to report
each other in order to generate leads for an investigation.43 Ad-
ditionally, the Gestapo targeted everyday “non-conforming be-
havior” almost as often as it did forbidden political dissent.44
By relying on denunciations, the Gestapo cultivated “the wide-
spread fear of being informed on or of being turned in on suspi-
cion of the least deviation.”45 Indeed, historical analysis shows
that not only did citizens inform on each other for various types
of sexual “deviations,” including race defilement, but that hus-
bands and wives informed on each other as well.46
Even beyond policing by the Gestapo and criminal police,
German women’s assimilation into a “vast state-run network”
of mothers47 presented an opportunity for women to indirectly
influence each other through the dissemination of propaganda
41. RGBL. I, 377 § 1 (1933) (“Ehestandsdarlehen werden nicht gewährt...
wenn nach der politischen Einstellung eines der beiden Ehegatten
anzunehmen ist, daß er sich nicht jederzeit rückhaltlos für den nationalen
Staat einsetzt”).
42. 2 NAZISM 1919–1945: A DOCUMENTARY READER 262 (J. Noakes & G.
Pridham eds., 2003) [hereinafter NAZISMDOCUMENTARY READER].
43. Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Political Denuncia-
tion in the Gestapo Case Files, 60 J. MOD. HIST. 654, 662 (1988) (illustrating
that in the Gestapo’s Düsseldorf branch, between 26 and 33 percent of all
investigations were instigated by “reports from the population”).
44. ROBERT GELLATELY, THE GESTAPO AND GERMAN SOCIETY: ENFORCING
RACIAL POLICY 1933–1945, at 47 (1991).
45. Gellately, supra note 43 at 661.
46. GELLATELY, supra note 44 at 148; VANDANA JOSHI, GENDER AND POWER
IN THE THIRD REICH: FEMALE DENOUNCERS AND THE GESTAPO, 1933–1945, at 45
(2003).
47. KOONZ, supra note 13, at 177.
758 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
and through “training mothers” in racial and family policy.48
The two women’s organizations under the Nazis, the NS-
Frauenschaft and the Deutsches Frauenwerk, became im-
mensely popular outlets for women to participate in “public
life,” although that participation was geared entirely toward
women’s roles as mothers and wives.49 These organizations typ-
ified the manner in which public, political participation by
German women was limited to advocacy related to their private
sphere, relegated to “areas that kept them far from men’s polit-
ical and economic concerns.”50
B. Race Hygiene and Racial Degeneration
As a counterpoint to the emphasis on Aryan reproduction,
Nazi policy also was preoccupied with eliminating populations
that threatened Aryan-racial dominance. The racial policies of
the Third Reich had deep roots in Hitler’s view of Jews as the
primary threat to the German people.51 The original 25-Point
Program of the National Socialist German Workers Party
(“NSDAP”), issued in 1920, set out the goals of the creation of a
Greater German “Volkish” state and the repudiation of citizen-
ship for those who were not members of the “Volk.”52 Upon tak-
ing power in 1933, the NSDAP immediately began to promul-
gate laws that were based on racial and hereditary distinctions,
as the marriage loan example shows. Codified racial discrimi-
nation rapidly became a part of the German social and legal
48. See LISA PINE, NAZI FAMILY POLICY, 1933–1945, at 76 (1997) (describing
the “training” carried out by the Reichsmütterdienst).
49. Id. at 73 (“By 1941, the aggregate number of members of these two
organisations had risen to approximately six million. Out of a total popula-
tion of some thirty million women over the age of eighteen, that made one
woman in every five a member of a National Socialist women’s organization
in 1941.”).
50. KOONZ, supra note 13, at 177.
51. On February 27, 1924, Hitler addressed a meeting of over three thou-
sand people to reestablish the National Socialist German Workers Party,
which had been banned after an attempted putsch two years before. In his
speech, he addressed his “racial comrades” and elucidated the dual threats of
“international Jewish financial hegemony” and “Marxism.” Adolf Hitler,
Speech to a Mass Meeting of the National Socialist German Workers Party,
Feb. 27, 1924, in LANDMARK SPEECHES OFNATIONAL SOCIALISM 15, 21 (Randall
L. Bytwerk ed., 2008).
52. 25-Punkte-Programm der NSDAP, Deutsches Historisches Museum,
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/nsdap25/.
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landscape. As Robert Gellately demonstrates, “Everyday life
became politicized in Nazi Germany, and, given the racial poli-
cy that was a paramount concern, the sphere of sexual and
friendly relations came under special scrutiny.”53
Since surveilling reproduction was of the utmost importance
to preserving the racial state,
[t]he importance of doctors for the regime’s efforts to police in-
timate spheres of life was recognized very early. Within
months of the NSDAP’s rise to power, a law was passed on
the prevention of hereditary diseases, which declared that all
doctors ‘without regard to professional confidentiality’ had a
duty to report pertinent discoveries.54
Those who suffered from “hereditary diseases” including blind-
ness, deafness, schizophrenia, or even “severe alcoholism” could
be sterilized without their consent.55 Similarly, midwives were
required to report babies born with defects.56 The infamous eu-
thanasia program, which relied on the participation and sup-
port of hundreds of doctors, evolved to keep so-called “crimi-
nals” and “degenerates” from procreating.57
Responding to the same concern about race “defilement,” the
Nuremberg Laws issued in 1935 forbade intermarriage and ex-
tramarital relations between Jews and citizens. 58 The first
supplementary decree to the Nuremberg laws distinguished
between Jews and those of mixed race, or Mischlinge, who had
one or two Jewish grandparents. 59 The law further distin-
guished between Mischlinge and those who “counted as Jews”
(Geltungsjuden) despite having only two Jewish grandparents
because they were married to a Jew or were the offspring of an
extramarital relationship with a Jew.60 The crime of Rassen-
schande, or “racial shame,” was punishable by imprisonment.61
The differentiation between Geltungsjuden and Mischlinge
bespoke an obsession not only with racial purity, but also with
53. Gellately, supra note 43, at 147.
54. Id. at 147.
55. RGBL. I 529 (1933).
56. NAZISMDOCUMENTARY READER, supra note 42 at 398.
57. Id. at 394 (“[C]riminals have the opportunity of procreating, degener-
ates are raised artificially and with difficulty.”).
58. RGBL. I, 1146–47 (1935).
59. RGBL. I, 1333 (1935).
60. RGBL. I, 1334 § 5 (1935).
61. RGBL. I, 1334 (1935).
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the inner workings and regulation of marriage as an institu-
tion. Geltungsjuden as a category were defined by reference to
their marital relationship or that of their parents. Under the
racial hierarchy encoded in the Nuremberg laws, Mischlinge
could marry Germans, while Geltungsjuden and Jews could
not. Men who committed Rassenschande would be punished,
while women—whether Jewish or Aryan—were not prosecuted.
The laws on hereditary diseases and intermarriage showed
that the NSDAP could regulate the most intimate of relation-
ships. Specifically, enforcement of the Nuremberg laws re-
quired deep involvement of the state in policing parenthood,
reproduction, and marriage. Indeed, state involvement in sexu-
ality and reproduction was so extensive that some historians
have concluded that the Nazi project simply did not recognize
“a ‘private’ sphere of sexuality.”62 Eric Voegelin, in his “Hitler
and the Germans” lectures in 1964, characterized this as a tru-
ly “totalitarian” system precisely because of its preoccupation
with “private” life.63 But the interests implicated by these in-
trusions are complex. Part II analyzes the values embedded in
the protection of these most intimate relationships.
II. DIGNITY AND LIBERTY
The right to privacy in European law evolved against this
background of intrusive policing of intimate relationships and
choices, but scholars have paid scant attention to this history.
This Part places the right to privacy in the context of the his-
torical reaction to totalitarian rule and its attendant intrusions
on family life. Contemporary accounts of the right to privacy in
European law offer two rationales for both its existence and
robustness as a legal norm. In one version, European law pro-
tects a dignitarian conception of privacy that emanates from
nineteenth-century traditions of honor and dueling. 64 Conti-
nental privacy law is less preoccupied with protecting against
violations carried out by the state than with those carried out
by one’s fellow citizens.65 In the more “conventional” version,
62. Elizabeth D. Heineman, Sexuality and Nazism: The Doubly Unspeaka-
ble? 11 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 22, 39 (2002).
63. 31 COLLECTEDWORKS OFERICVOEGELIN 132 (1999).
64. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1166–67.
65. See id. at 1182 (“German jurists in and after the 1880s perceived their
problem as a problem of honor, to be dealt with through the law of insult, in
coordination with the law of artistic property.”).
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European privacy law responded to Nazism and its abuse of
“state power.”66 Thus, contemporary European limitations on
surveillance and police powers can be attributed to the earlier
growth of a police state under Hitler.67
However, both of these explanations neglect the types of pri-
vacy violations that animated lawmakers in the post-World
War II era to enact privacy protections into law. Because of the
violations which occurred during the Third Reich, as described
above, many of which were particularly oriented toward sex,
gender, family, and marriage, privacy was formulated as a hu-
man right. A right enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”), the German constitution, and a host
of other international instruments.68 In neglecting aspects of
privacy that protect reproductive freedom and family life, con-
temporary scholarship offers a rich yet incomplete view of pri-
vacy as a political right.
A. Limitations of the Current Approach
The scholarship explaining the differences between European
and American privacy law encompasses two basic approaches.
In an influential account of the divergence between European
and American privacy law, James Q. Whitman states that con-
temporary European privacy law “is the result of a centuries-
long, slow-maturing revolt” against “status privilege.”69 Today,
as a consequence of this revolt, everybody is entitled to be
treated “in ways that only highly placed and wealthy people
were treated a couple of centuries ago.”70 In Whitman’s ac-
count, contemporary European privacy rights are oriented to-
ward “dignity” because they “are all rights to control your pub-
lic image—rights to guarantee that people see you the way you
want to be seen.”71 Whitman demonstrates that the emergence
of a free press in France came hand in hand with concern that
66. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Com-
parative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609,
687–88 (2007).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 12, Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATYDOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
69. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1166.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1161.
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the press would violate reputational norms by “insulting” citi-
zens and reporting on “the delicacy of private life.”72 In Germa-
ny, the dual roots of Roman insult law and the law of artistic
creation gave rise to a tradition of “protecting honor to its full-
est extent.”73 In Whitman’s account, the trajectory of European
privacy protections has been generally upward ever since.74
Two aspects of Whitman’s account are particularly striking.
First, Whitman cites exclusively private law cases, usually tort
actions to enjoin publication or to recover damages after the
publication of embarrassing material. However, at least in the
Weimar Republic, there did exist a constitutional right of pri-
vacy in one’s home 75 and correspondence. 76 Second, while
many, if not most, of the early privacy cases that Whitman
cites discuss sexual conduct or nudity, in these cases, it is strik-
ing that the subjects—women—are not ordinarily defending
their own privacy rights; rather, their husbands or paramours
stand up to vindicate their masculine honor in court.77 Two of
Whitman’s examples show this to be the case in France in par-
ticular. Alexander Dumas sued to vindicate his right to privacy
when pictures appeared of his girlfriend in her underwear; the
72. Thus, in 1833, reports that the widowed Duchess of Berry was preg-
nant resulted in multiple duels in order to defend the honor of “private life.”
Id. at 1172, 1174.
73. Id. at 1185.
74. Whitman’s account has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Alenka Kuhelj,
The Twilight Zone of Privacy for Passengers on International Flights Between
the EU and USA, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 383, 409–10 (2010) (at-
tributing differences in privacy law to “cultural values”) (citing Whitman); M.
James Daly, Information Age Catch 22: The Challenge of Technology to Cross-
Border Disclosure & Data Privacy, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 121, 128 (2011) (at-
tributing differences to “contrasting political and social ideals”) (citing Whit-
man); Jake Spratt, An Economic Argument for Electronic Privacy, 6 I/S: J. L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 513, 519–20 (2011) (attributing differences to “cul-
tural differences”) (citing Whitman).
75. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [VdDR] [Constitution of the German
Reich] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 115.
76. Id. art. 117.
77. In particular, Whitman’s discussion of early French privacy cases cen-
ters on several incidents in which men sue to vindicate their privacy rights in
their paramours’ images. Whitman, supra note 8, at 1175–77. While his dis-
cussion of early German privacy law focuses more on statutes and less on
implementation by the courts, Whitman also argues that German privacy law
stems from the Roman law of insult, which “came to protect respectable
women against lewd comments.” Id. at 1183.
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Court sided with him on the basis of “good morals.”78 In 1868, a
husband successfully defended his privacy right to his wife’s
nude image; the court cited “the inviolability of the domestic
hearth.”79 The courts adjudicating early privacy rights sided
with “honor” over publicity in large part because it would have
been dishonorable to have one’s wife leave the private sphere
and appear in public—nude, no less.
The second, more “conventional” approach to conceptualizing
European privacy law explains that privacy rights protect
against intrusions by the state and respond to a legacy of the
misuse of personal information by totalitarian regimes. In
Francesca Bignami’s account of the divergence between Conti-
nental and American data privacy law, she argues that the ex-
perience of a police state under Nazi Germany is at the root of
contemporary European data privacy law.80 Invoking the Ger-
man attempt to conscript Norwegian men using Norwegian
government files that aggregated population data, Bignami ar-
gues that the misuse of personal records is the “object of Euro-
pean privacy law.”81 The Nazis’ use of personal records to tar-
get Jews, Communists, and other undesirable groups is widely
seen as the root of European privacy law.82 Legal scholars con-
juring the specter of totalitarian “police states” often similarly
78. Id. at 1176.
79. Id. at 1175–77.
80. Bignami, supra note 66, at 609–10.
81. Id. at 610.
82. Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal In-
formation Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match? 22
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 307, 328 (2008) (“Concern over personal privacy,
particularly regarding personal data privacy, in the European Union has a
long history, due to the Nazis and fascists scouring family records and other
personal documents to target individuals in the 1930s and 1940s.”); Steven R.
Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International Rela-
tions, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655, 666 (2002) (“The European emphasis on
personal privacy rights may be attributable in part to Third Reich abuses in
tracking its target groups with invasive data-collection methods.”); Arthur
Rizer, Dog Fight: Did the International Battle Over Airline Passenger Name
Records Enable the Christmas-Day Bomber?, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 81
(2010) (“[T]his fundamental difference in attitude between Europeans and
Americans was rooted in the use of death lists and domestic spying both in
Nazi Germany and in Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe.”).
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call upon the danger of allowing centralized governments to
know too much information about a person.83
This view too, is incomplete, as it neglects interests in family
and “private” life and focuses exclusively on information priva-
cy.84 As privacy scholar Julie Inness has argued, however, the
concept of “privacy” embraces at least three core responsibili-
ties: information, access, and intimate decision making.85 In
American as well as European law, privacy rights play a role in
adjudicating disputes surrounding contraception, abortion,
marriage, and labor. It is true that the development of new
technology has pushed concerns about surveillance by commer-
cial and government entities to the forefront. As Daniel Solove
writes, “Today, the predominant mode of spreading information
is not through the flutter of gossiping tongues but through the
language of electricity, where information pulses between mas-
sive record systems and databases.”86 But conflating data pro-
tection law with the “right to privacy” raises more questions
than it answers about the principles from which these legal
protections emerged. Comprehensive data protection law in
Europe did not emerge until the 1980s, when the risks of com-
puterized information collection, aggregation, and dissemina-
tion became much clearer. But the privacy protections embed-
ded in the ECHR predate questions about data protection by
almost twenty years.87 Indeed, if the argument is that privacy
83. See, e.g. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 182 (2004) (“The government can use dossi-
ers of personal information in mass roundups of distrusted or suspicious in-
dividuals whenever the political climate is ripe.”); Aaron M. Clemens, The
Pending Reinvigoration of Boyd: Personal Papers are Protected by the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 75, 122 (2004) (“The
lessons learned from the totalitarian regimes in the former Soviet Union and
Nazi Germany should deter America from going down the path of ubiquitous
surveillance coupled with untrammeled governmental authority.”).
84. INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (Daniel J. Solove and Paul M. Schwartz,
eds. 2011) (“Information privacy is often contrasted with ‘decisional privacy,’
which concerns the freedom to make decisions about one’s body and family.”)
85. Julie Inness, Information, Access, or Intimate Decisions About One’s
Actions? The Content of Privacy, 5 PUB. AFF. Q. 227, 227 (1991).
86. SOLOVE, supra note 83, at 2.
87. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the
Committee of Ministers to assess the adequacy of Article 8 to protect personal
data in 1968. In 1981, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, by which point some states had already passed data protection legisla-
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law reflected concerns about abuse by Nazis and fascists, the
framers of the ECHR had a much fresher memory of those
abuses in 1949 than did the drafters of data protection laws in
the 1970s and 1980s.
Finally, most of the scholarship does not define either “digni-
ty” or “liberty,” despite relying on these concepts to draw a dis-
tinction between the European and American traditions.88 In
the privacy literature, the term “liberty” connotes additional
political protections to those that are encompassed by the term
“dignity,”89 but “dignity” itself has been cited as a source of
rights (as well as a freestanding right), especially in the human
rights space.90 In short, these concepts are overlapping, com-
plex, and used by legal scholars in unclear ways.
Every definition of human dignity relies on the ability to
think, speak, and act with autonomy. Immanuel Kant’s concept
of dignity as a form of “intrinsic worth”—and the characteristic
that prevents humankind from being considered from means
rather than ends in themselves91—was hugely influential on
the German constitution-drafting process after World War II as
well as on the development of human rights.92 As Rhoda How-
ard and Jack Donnelly argue, “[h]uman rights are a particular
tion. See JACQUELINE KLOSEK, DATA PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 13
(2000).
88. Neither Whitman nor Bignami offer a cohesive concept of dignity as
opposed to liberty.
89. See Whitman, supra note 8, at 1161 (defining the American concept of
privacy as “the right to freedom from intrusions by the state, especially in
one’s own home”).
90. Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 848, 853 (1983).
91. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 38 (Ab-
bott trans., 1785).
92. Christopher McCrudden, In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduc-
tion to Current Debates, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 7 (Christopher
McCrudden ed., 2013) (summarizing controversy about role of Kant in consti-
tutional framing); see also EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY & LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS INGERMANY AND THEUNITED STATES 7 (2002) (“[T]he
founders of the Federal Republic drew deep upon German tradition to found
the legal order on moral and rational idealism, particularly that of Kant and
Hegel.”); DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 361–62 (3d ed. 2012).
(“In seeking to advance human dignity as a constitutional value, both court
and commentators have relied on three politically significant sources of ethi-
cal theory in postwar Germany—Christian natural law, Kantianism, and
social democratic thought.”).
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social practice that aims to realize a distinctive substantive
conception of human dignity.”93 That substantive conception
rests on “values of equality and autonomy.”94 Contemporary
theoreticians routinely invoke autonomy as the underpinning
of dignity. Jeremy Waldron offers a definition of dignity that is
foremost “predicated on the fact that she is recognized as hav-
ing the ability to control and regulate her actions in accordance
with her own apprehension of norms and reasons that apply to
her.”95
But autonomy undergirds notions of liberty as much as it
does dignity. As J.S. Mill conceived of it, the “appropriate re-
gion of human liberty” included not only the liberty of “thought
and feeling,” but also, and more controversially, “liberty of
tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our
own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequenc-
es as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them.”96 Isaiah
Berlin’s concept of “positive liberty” itself resembles human
rights-type concepts of human dignity:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on ex-
ternal forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of
my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject,
not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes,
which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were,
from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer — de-
ciding, not being decided for, self‐directed and not acted upon
by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an
animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is,
of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising
them.97
As Berlin conceives of it, this concept of liberty places a higher
safeguard on political power than does the “negative” concept of
93. Rhoda E. Howard & Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity, Human Rights,
and Political Regimes, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 802 (1986).
94. Id. at 802.
95. Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity 2–3 (N.Y.U. School of Law
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-83, 2011)
(emphasis added),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973341.
96. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (1901).
97. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 178 (Henry Hardy & Ian Harris eds., 2002).
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liberty that leaves only a space for self-determination, for “[i]f
the tyrant (or ‘hidden persuader’) manages to condition his sub-
jects (or customers) into losing their original wishes and em-
bracing (‘internalising’) the form of life he has invented for
them, he will, on this definition, have succeeded in liberating
them.”98 Yet Berlin’s conception of “positive liberty” is not ter-
ribly distinct from Waldron’s concept of dignity, which also em-
phasizes the importance of self-determination and control.99
This brief philosophical tour illustrates that the terms “digni-
ty” and “liberty” come packed with meaning, but it is not at all
clear what purpose they serve in privacy scholarship. Perhaps
we should assume that a dignity-oriented approach to privacy
protects privacy in light of societal expectations, while a liber-
ty-oriented approach protects autonomous choice free of state
interference.100 As the next section shows, the privacy protec-
tions in place in the ECHR seem not to reflect concerns about
informational privacy as much as about privacy regarding fam-
ily, sex, and marriage—concerns that seem more appropriately
categorized as “intimate decision making.”101 Importantly, the
area of family, reproduction, and marriage is one in which the
interests in dignity and liberty, so defined, may collapse to
some extent. A woman’s dignity interest in bodily privacy is
inextricably linked to her liberty interest in nonintervention by
the state in reproduction. A man’s dignity interest in his “pri-
vate sphere” is closely related to his liberty interest in choosing
the way in which his children are educated and raised.102 In
other words, the notion that privacy is oriented toward “digni-
ty” simply because it happens to protect the way one is per-
ceived by the outer world fails to account for the many diverse
interests that privacy defends.
B. Privacy as Human Right
Given widespread disagreement about the content of the pri-
vacy right, it is all the more striking that European laws give
98. Id. at 186.
99. Waldron, supra note 95, at 4 (discussing legal protections for “dignity”
as “connected to the idea that humans are capable of self-control”).
100. Robert Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092–93
(2001).
101. Inness, supra note 85, at 227.
102. See discussion infra pp. 21–23.
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such affirmative protection to the right. Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.103
In contrast with the law of the United States, where the right
to privacy is not written into the Constitution’s text, the inclu-
sion of privacy as a human right is striking. The ECHR is a su-
pranational instrument and, in many European regimes, has a
higher status than domestic law.104 Many, though not all, Eu-
ropean constitutions recognize rights to privacy in their enu-
meration of civil liberties.105 Even those that do not are bound
to respect Article 8, if they have ratified the Convention.
At first glance, the inclusion of privacy rights in internation-
al-human rights regimes is consonant with Whitman’s conclu-
sion that European privacy norms are geared toward protecting
dignity, because the purpose of human rights instruments in
general is to secure human dignity.106 Thus, the first “human
rights instrument”—the U.N. Charter—purports “to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
103. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter “European Con-
vention on Human Rights” or “ECHR”].
104. See Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, Assessing the Impact of the
ECHR on National Legal Systems, in AEUROPE OFRIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE
ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 683 (Alec Stone Sweet ed., 2008) (argu-
ing that the ECHR is most effective in strongly monist states).
105. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art.
10 (Ger.) (privacy of correspondence, mail, and telecommunications);
KONSTYTUCJA [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 17, 1997, art. 49 (Pol.) (same); 1994 CONST.
art. 22 (Belg.) (privacy and family life); BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV]
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 13 (Switz.) (privacy and family
life); but see 1958 CONST. (Fr.) (no provision for privacy).
106. See, e.g., SABINE C. CAREY, MARK GIBNEY & STEVEN C. POE, THE
POLITICS OFHUMAN RIGHTS: THEQUEST FORDIGNITY (2010).
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of nations large and small.”107 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is similarly premised on the “recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family.”108 While human rights might
not be a necessary step to securing human dignity,109 a “natu-
ral rights” conception of human dignity is certainly the moral
and theoretical underpinning to human rights.110 Facially, it
seems plausible that the inclusion of “privacy” in international
human rights instruments can be best understood as an out-
growth of the sort of “dignity” interest that human rights are
intended to protect. At the same time, it is evident that human
rights regimes unfolded in large part in response to the atroci-
ties of the Second World War and of the Holocaust.111
1. Legislative History of the European Convention on Human
Rights
In 1949, speaking in front of the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe, Pierre-Henri Teitgen said,
Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil
progresses cunningly, with a minority operating, as it were, to
remove the levers of control…. It is necessary to intervene be-
fore it is too late. A conscience must exist somewhere which
will sound the alarm to the minds of a nation, menaced by
this progressive corruption, to war[n] them of the peril and to
show them that they are progressing down a long road which
leads far, sometimes even to Buchenwald or Dachau.112
Indeed, as Andrew Moravcsik demonstrates, the ECHR enjoyed
particular support from national governments that were new to
107. U.N. Charter pmbl.
108. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl.
(Dec. 10, 1948).
109. See Jack E. Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic
Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
302 (1982).
110. See Johannes Morsink, The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration, 6
HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1984).
111. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 16–17 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, & David Wippman, eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing
World War II as the “catalyst” for development of human rights law, new
limitations on the use of force, and international criminal law).
112. ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 1 (2010).
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democracy because “human rights norms are expressions of the
self-interest of democratic governments in ‘locking in’ demo-
cratic rule through the enforcement of human rights.”113 En-
forceable human rights did not evolve purely in reaction to
substantive violations by totalitarian dictatorships that recon-
stituted states’ values;114 rather, Moravcsik argues that states’
calculations were highly institutional: “By far the most con-
sistent public justification for the ECHR . . . was that it might
help combat domestic threats from the totalitarian right and
left, thereby stabilizing domestic democracy and preventing
international aggression.”115 Nascent democracies had an in-
terest in consolidating democratic institutions in such a way
that they would be able to resist later threats to democratic
rule.116
The ECHR was modeled largely on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which had been adopted as a non-
binding framework for human rights the year before.117 Sur-
prisingly, although the UDHR was framed as a response to
World War II, the Commission did not grapple extensively with
the legacy of the Holocaust.118 As Mary Ann Glendon puts it,
“There was relatively little discussion of Nazi atrocities in the
Human Rights Commission, probably because the members
saw the business of punishing war criminals as belonging to
the law of war (the Nuremberg Principles and the Genocide
Convention) and regarded their own task as setting conditions
for peace.”119
113. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Post-War Europe, 54 INT’LORG. 217, 228 (2000).
114. For this idea, Moravcsik cites Martha Finnemore & Katherine Sik-
kink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887
(1998); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Collective Identity in a Democratic Communi-
ty: The Case of NATO, in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND
IDENTITY INWORLD POLITICS (Peter Katzenstein, ed., 1996); and Jack Donnel-
ly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT’LORG. 599 (1986).
115. Moravcsik, supra note 113, at 237.
116. Id.
117. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
118. MARY ANN GLENDON, WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSALDECLARATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS 189 (2001).
119. Id. According to Glendon, the one major exception was in the discus-
sion surrounding Article 26 on education, where the representatives pre-
served parents’ rights to determine the form of their children’s education
against the background of Nazi indoctrination.
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The first draft of the “International Bill of Rights” was writ-
ten primarily by John E. Humphrey, a Canadian international
law expert who served on the three-member drafting commit-
tee that convened in spring 1947.120 The privacy provision in
that first draft read:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary searches or seizures, or
to unreasonable interference with his person, home, family re-
lations, reputation, privacy, activities, or personal property.
The secrecy of correspondence shall be respected.121
In considering the draft, every representative agreed that the
provision had a place in the declaration, although there was
uncertainty as to the form it should take.122 One representa-
tive, from Chile, suggested that the “inviolability of property
and correspondence” should be separate from the provision that
protected family relations.123 By the next session of the Com-
mission in December, the language had changed and subse-
quently read, “The privacy of the home and of correspondence
and respect for reputation shall be protected by law.”124 In the
form in which it was finally adopted, the UDHR read:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the pro-
tection of the law against such interference or attacks.125
In framing the ECHR, the Consultative Assembly explicitly
relied on the language in place in the UDHR, but it considered
totalitarian abuses much more openly than had the Human
Rights Commission.126 This is consonant with Moravcsik’s ar-
120. Id. at 47–48.
121. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Draft Outline of International Bill of
Rights, art. 11, Comm’n on Human Rights Drafting Comm., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/3 (June 4, 1947).
122. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, at
5–6, Comm’n on Human Rights Drafting Comm., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.4 (June 13, 1947).
123. Id. at 6.
124. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Parallel Passages in Human Rights Draft-
ing Committee Text and United States Proposal, at 4, Comm’n on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/36/Add.2 (Dec. 5, 1947).
125. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12
(Dec. 10, 1948).
126. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that representatives of the Soviet
Union as well as Czechoslovakia and Belarus were involved in the drafting of
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gument that the ECHR served to “lock in” domestic democratic
policy through a formal international mechanism.127 But it was
not only the case that nations chose to support binding and ef-
fective human rights mechanisms because they desired the ex-
ternal support against totalitarianism.128 It is also true that the
negotiators of the ECHR considered the substantive rights in
the Convention to be safeguards against undemocratic abuse.
This was the case with regard to political rights such as the
right to a fair trial129 and the right to free thought.130
Even more so, the Committee overtly grounded the Conven-
tion’s privacy protections in an opposition to totalitarian abus-
es. The first draft of the Convention, submitted by the “Euro-
pean Movement,” had no explicit “privacy” provision but two
separate provisions for “the natural rights deriving from mar-
riage and paternity and those pertaining to the family” and
“the sanctity of the home.”131 At the first session of the Consul-
tative Assembly, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the Committee’s rap-
porteur, summoned the “scourges of the modern world”—
”Fascism, Hitlerism, Communism”—as a reason that human
the UDHR. Moreover, the UDHR was a non-binding instrument, whereas the
ECHR would bind the states’ parties.
127. Moravcsik, supra note 113, at 220.
128. Id. at 231 (using compulsory jurisdiction and the right of individual
petition as a proxy to measure the degree of support for a binding regime).
129. For example, the British delegation to the Assembly clarified the
ECHR’s proposed inclusion on trial rights, arguing that the only way that the
European Court could take jurisdiction would be if “the national court was
prevented from giving a judgment which would really be the satisfactory
judgment of a court” because it “had been forced to put into effect arbitrary
and undemocratic laws.” COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUR. COMM’N OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, PREPARATORY WORK ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 7–8 (1956),
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART6-
DH(56)11-EN1338886.PDF.
130. In the report accompanying its draft, the Committee on Legal and Ad-
ministrative Questions explained that it recommended a general “freedom of
thought” provision in part to protect against “those abominable ‘methods of
police enquiry or judicial process which rob the suspected or accused person
of control of his intellectual faculties and of his conscience.’” COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUR. COMM’N OFHUMAN RIGHTS, PREPARATORYWORK ONARTICLE 9 OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3–4 (1956),
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART9-
DH(56)14-EN1338892.pdf.
131. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES 296 (1975) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES]
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rights were necessary.132 However, there had been some disa-
greement within the committee about whether the “family
rights” provisions ought to be included in the Convention be-
cause they were not “essential for the functioning of democratic
institutions.”133 Most of the committee, however, “thought that
the racial restrictions on the right of marriage made by the to-
talitarian regimes, as also the forced regimentation of children
and young persons organised by these regimes, should be abso-
lutely prohibited.”134 At the first session of the Assembly, Teit-
gen clarified the disagreement:
No one in the Committee . . . has denied the vital importance
of these family rights. . . . The Committee recalled the time in
the recent past when, in some countries, certain people were
denied the right to marry on account of race or religious con-
victions. It also recalled the legislation, under which some
countries suffered during cruel years, which subordinated the
child to the benefit of the State. . . . It considered that the fa-
ther of a family cannot be an independent citizen, cannot feel
free within his own country, if he is menaced in his own home
and if, every day, the State steals from him his soul, or the
conscience of his children.135
Teitgen also clarified that the right to marry did not additional-
ly require states to guarantee “equal rights during marriage,”
as the UDHR seemed to.136 Thus, the ECHR’s provision on
“private life” was more protective of privacy than the UDHR’s
because it minimized intrusions into the family unit and the
spousal relationship.
2. Legislative History of the Basic Law
The 1949 Basic Law is a product of similar cultural and polit-
ical “milieu” as the 1950 ECHR.137 Like the ECHR and other
human rights instruments, the Basic Law foregrounds dignity
as the “driving principle” of constitutional law.138 The Basic
Law’s concept of dignity reflects “Christian natural law, Kanti-
an moral philosophy, and more individualistic, or existential,
132. Id. at 40.
133. TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 131, at 3–4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 270.
136. Id. at 268.
137. EBERLE, supra note 92, at 22.
138. Id. at 50.
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theories of personal autonomy and self-determination.”139 One
commentator on the German constitution drafting process
notes that different forms of expressing the concept of dignity
were considered, including the sentence: “The state is there for
the sake of the people, not the people for the sake of the
state.”140 The point of the Article, as the sentence hints, is to
serve as a “counterpoint” to the ideology of National Social-
ism.141 Indeed, the inclusion of citizens’ basic rights as the first
section of the Basic Law was also meant to mark the turn away
from National Socialism and its disregard for basic liberties.142
Nonetheless, the drafters of the Basic Law referred less to
Germany’s recent totalitarian past than did the drafters of the
UDHR or ECHR. This can be attributed at least in part to the
slow process of grappling with the past that Germany went
through after the war.143
German privacy rights are rooted in Article 2 of the Basic
Law, which guarantees the “free development of personality”:
(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of
his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of oth-
ers or offend against the constitutional order or the moral
law.
(2) Every person shall have the right to life and physical in-
tegrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These
rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.144
139. Id. at 42–43.
140. INGO VON MÜNCH & PHILIP KUNIG, GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 69 ¶ 6
(5th ed. 2003) (“Das sollte den beabsichtigten Kontrapunkt zur Ideologie des
Nationalsozialismus… besonders deutlich markieren… Auch die schließlich
gewählte Formulierung bedeutet eine unmißverständliche Absage an den
Totalitarismus al seiner Konzeption vom Staate , der die Herabwürdigung
des einzelnen gleichsam immanent ist . . . , zwar nicht sein Ziel, aber das—
wie alle Erfahrung lehrt—von ihm bewirkte Ergebnis.”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 22 ¶ 5 (“Mit der Hervorhebung der Grundrechte durch ihre
Platzierung im 1. Abschnitt des GG wird die Abkehr von der NS-Zeit deutlich
gemacht, also von einem grundrechtslosen Abschnitt in der langen Geschich-
te der Grundrechte.”).
143. See Wulf Kansteiner, Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The
Legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in THE POLITICS OFMEMORY IN POST-WAR EUROPE 102 (Richard Ned
Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner & Claudio Fogu eds., 2006).
144. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 2 (Ger.).
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Other provisions of the Basic Law also touch on privacy, but
constitutional privacy jurisprudence centers on the “personality
right” guaranteed by Article 2.145 One commentator traces the
roots of the personality right to the “path breaking concretiza-
tion of human dignity.”146
The original draft of the Basic Law’s guarantee of personality
rights that emerged from the Herrenchiemsee conference actu-
ally deeply emphasized individual liberty. The original draft of
Article 2 read:
(1) All people are free.
(2) Each person has the freedom, within the constraints of the
legal order and good sense, to do anything that does not harm
others.147
However, when the Parliamentary Council met to draft the
Basic Law, the drafters thought that the language wasn’t spe-
cific enough and worried that although freedom needed to be
limited to the legal order, the restriction was too open to inter-
pretation.148 Other provisions of the draft that were meant to
protect privacy actually mirrored the Weimar constitution. The
Herrenchiemsee draft article on the inviolability of the home,
for example, read, “Everyone’s home is his sanctuary and invio-
lable. Searches and seizures of living spaces are permitted only
in the situations and forms prescribed by the law.”149 The 1919
Weimar Constitution had read, in comparison, “Every Ger-
man’s home is his sanctuary and inviolable. Exceptions may
145. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 10 (Ger.)
(providing for the privacy of “correspondence, posts and telecommunica-
tions”).
146. THEODOR MAUNZ, GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 14 (8th ed. 2012) (“Das
Recht auf freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit ist von ihrem grundsätzlichen
Gehalt her die wegweisende Konkretisierung der Menschenwürde.”).
147. 1 JAHRBUCH ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 54 (1951) (“(1) Alle Menschen sind
frei. (2) Jedermann hat die Freiheit, innerhalb der Schranken der
Rechtsordnung und der guten Sitten alles zu tun, was anderen nicht scha-
det.”).
148. Id.
149. Entwurf zu einem Grundgesetz für einen Bund deutscher Länder
(Herrenchiemseer Entwurf) [Draft Constitution for a Federation of German
States] art. 5 (1948) (Ger.), available at
http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de49/chiemseerentwurf48.htm.
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only be made as provided by law.”150 As ratified, the provision
for the inviolability of the home encompasses seven sections
and was held out in contrast to the “masterpiece of brevity” an-
ticipated by the Herrenchiemsee draft.151 The provision on pri-
vacy of correspondence, mail, and telecommunications re-
mained almost unchanged from Weimar onward.152
III. BRIDGING THEDIVIDE
The “exceptional” story of the foundation of European privacy
law is frequently trotted out to explain why Europeans and
Americans just can’t see eye-to-eye on issues of privacy protec-
tion. Indeed, contemporary policy-makers and scholars have
embraced the view that the two legal traditions of privacy are
irreconcilable. Last year, Barry Steinhardt, the chairman of
Friends of Privacy, called the divergence a “titanic clash.”153
Commentators have analyzed the differences between U.S. and
150. VERFASSUNGDESDEUTSCHEN REICHS [VDDR] [CONSTITUTIONOFGERMAN
REICH] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 115 (Ger.).
151. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 13 (Ger.);
see Wolfgang Schäuble, Federal Minister of the Interior, The Herrenchiemsee
Constitutional Convention 60 Years On (July 20, 2008),
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/2008/07/bm_herrenchiemsee_
en.html.
152. Compare VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [VDDR] [CONSTITUTION
OF GERMAN REICH] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 117 (Ger.) (“The secrecy of letters and
all postal, telegraphic and telephone communications is inviolable. Excep-
tions are inadmissible except by Reich law.”) with Entwurf zu einem
Grundgesetz für einen Bund deutscher Länder (Herrenchiemseer Entwurf)
[Draft Constitution for a Federation of German States] art. 11 (1948) (Ger.),
available at http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de49/chiemseerentwurf48.htm
(“(1) The secrecy of letters, post, and telecommunications is inviolable. (2)
Exceptions may only be made by judicial process in the situations and forms
prescribed by the law.”) and GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949,
BGBL. I, art. 10 (Ger.) (“(1) The privacy of letters and all postal and telecom-
munications is inviolable. (2) Restrictions may only be ordered in accordance
with a law.”). As ratified, Article 10 also provided that if the restriction
“serves to protect the free democratic basic order,” the subject of the violation
need not be informed. This corresponded with Article 18, which provided that
those who abused certain basic rights would be considered to have forfeited
them. This provision is known as a form of “militant democracy.” See
KOMMERS&MILLER, supra note 92, at 286.
153. Kevin J. O’Brien, Silicon Valley Companies Lobbying Against Europe’s
Privacy Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/technology/eu-privacy-proposal-lays-
bare-differences-with-us.html.
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EU “approaches to personal privacy” as the root of divergences
about the proper role of industry self-regulation and the “right
to be forgotten.”154 Although diplomats have attempted to rec-
oncile the two traditions, recognizing that this could lead to
less conflict and more legal certainty for many actors,155 they
also continue to embrace a narrative that European privacy
law emerged from a wholly different tradition than did U.S.
privacy law.156
Despite the gendered sources of privacy law, privacy scholars
and policy-makers largely ignore sex, gender, and family. While
many have recognized the uneasy balance between privacy as
protection and privacy as oppression when it comes to women’s
interests,157 most have simply ignored the gender-based roots of
contemporary privacy, focusing instead on information privacy.
Tellingly, the evolution of privacy as a human right, with its
particularly gendered history, parallels the evolution of the
privacy right in American jurisprudence, which also, in its ear-
ly days, largely focused on privacy within the home and fami-
ly. 158 Yet in areas of transatlantic cooperation—or, perhaps
154. Scott Bradner, Europe Cares about Privacy, So You Must Too,
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 7, 2012, 2:55 PM),
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2185609/security/europe-cares-about-
privacy—so-you-must-too.html.
155. See, e.g., William E. Kennard, U.S. Ambassador to the EU, Remarks at
Forum Europe’s 3rd Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Confer-
ence (Dec. 4, 2012), http://useu.usmission.gov/kennard_120412.html (stress-
ing “shared values and commitments” between Europe and the United
States); see also Cameron Kerry, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce General Counsel,
CFK Keynote Address at the Second Annual European Data Protection and
Privacy Conference On Transatlantic Solutions for Data Privacy (Dec. 6,
2011), http://useu.usmission.gov/kerry_120611.html (“[W]e share the common
goal of protecting private information while also facilitating innovation.”).
156. See, e.g., Kennard, supra note 155 (“The United States was founded
on—and its modern-day laws, regulations and practices reflect this—a core
belief in the importance of protecting citizens from government intrusion.”);
Omar Tene, Privacy in Europe and the United States: I Know It When I See It,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (June 27, 2011), https://cdt.org/blog/privacy-
in-europe-and-the-united-states-i-know-it-when-i-see-it/ (quoting Whitman
extensively for the proposition that “when it comes to privacy, the cross-
Atlantic harmony breaks down”).
157. See generally, ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN
A FREE SOCIETY (1988); Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000).
158. See, e.g., De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148–49 (Mich. 1881) (holding
that, where physician had brought an “unprofessional young married man
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more accurately, competition—over privacy law and policy, the
narrative is one of simple legal and political difference.
Although contemporary privacy concerns largely center on
new technology and surveillance by public and private actors, it
is far from true that this type of concern is gender neutral. On
the contrary, concerns about keeping information about sex,
gender, and family private animate much of the public debate
about privacy in the United States as well as in Europe. This
Part examines three areas of policy clashes between the United
States and Europe regarding privacy.
A. Business Practices Regarding Online User Privacy
An appreciation of the common roots of privacy rights across
the Atlantic can help harmonize the law applicable to busi-
nesses that serve European and U.S. customers, and confront
difficult conflicting obligations regarding user privacy in the
two regimes.159 User data in the European Union is protected
by comprehensive statute as well as the European Conven-
tion.160 By contrast, user data in the United States is protected
by sectoral legislation in some areas but not in others.161 Alt-
with him” to witness plaintiff’s labor and childbirth, plaintiff’s “legal right to
privacy” was violated). De May is, by many accounts, the first illustration of
the “right to privacy” in American jurisprudence. See GARRET KEIZER,
PRIVACY, 69–70 (2012); Caroline Danielson, The Gender of Privacy and the
Embodied Self: Examining the Origins of the Right to Privacy in U.S. Law, 25
FEMINIST STUD. 311, 311–13 (1999) (“De May v. Roberts . . . is the earliest case
in the United States explicitly to name a right to privacy.”) (citations omit-
ted).
159. See, e.g., Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Comm’n,
Speech at the 2nd Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-
851_en.htm?locale=FR (“[T]his is a globalised world and we are also counting
on others to take data protection seriously. . . . However, I have been told that
only voluntary codes of conduct based on multi-stakeholder consultations are
envisaged [in the United States].”); Kerry, supra note 155 (“[A]lthough gov-
ernments may take different approaches to privacy protection, it is critical to
the continued growth of the digital economy that they strive to create in-
teroperability between privacy regimes that often are fundamentally simi-
lar.”).
160. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (laying out com-
prehensive protection and obligations for subjects, data controllers, and data
processors).
161. See, e.g., Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994) (pro-
tecting confidential driver records); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401–342 (1978) (protecting confidential financial records); Family Educa-
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hough European privacy law is palpably different from U.S.
privacy law, American firms that do business in Europe must
comply with European law. Differing responsibilities under the
two regimes increase costs and make compliance more difficult.
U.S.-based companies have faced fines by European privacy
regulators for activities that violate European law but would be
entirely appropriate under U.S. law. For instance, in April,
2013, German data protection authorities fined Google for “ille-
gally collecting personal online data from unencrypted Wi-Fi
networks” in connection with its Street View product.162 Google
is additionally under investigation by six national data protec-
tion authorities for violations of European law in connection
with its decision to share user information across all of its ser-
vices.163
One area of conflict in the commercial realm is e-discovery,
where discovery requirements for litigation in U.S. courts often
conflict with European privacy rules.164 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require parties to disclose “all documents, elec-
tronically stored information, and tangible things” pertinent to
a discovery request.165 Yet the Data Protection Directive forbids
a potential litigant to retain certain types of discoverable data
without consent from the data subject.166 Commentary about
tional Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (protecting confidential edu-
cational records). There is no U.S. statute that applies generally to online
user privacy.
162. Claire Cain Miller & Kevin J. O’Brien, Germany’s Complicated Rela-
tionship With Google Street View, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/germanys-complicated-relationship-
with-google-street-view/; see also Lauren H. Rakower, Note, Blurred Line:
Zooming In On Google Street View And The Global Right To Privacy, 37
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 317, 327 n.75 (2011) (“[I]n Germany, where the debate on
surveillance is tinged with memories of the role played by the Nazis’ Gestapo
and the East German Stasi secret police, doubts have been raised about the
transparency of the [Google Street View] project.”) (citation omitted).
163. Charles Arthur, Google Facing Legal Threat from Six European Coun-
tries over Privacy, GUARDIAN, Apr. 2, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/apr/02/google-privacy-policy-
legal-threat-europe.
164. Tania Abbas, Note, U.S. Preservation Requirements and EU Data Pro-
tection: Headed For Collision?, 36 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 258
(2013).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
166. See Data Protection Directive, art. 6 (providing that “personal data
must be . . . collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not
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this conflict has traced its roots to the position of the right to
privacy in European law as a fundamental right.167
The debate over how to limit and regulate targeted online
advertising encapsulates some of the main perceived diver-
gences between European and American privacy law. Targeted
advertising, also called “behavioral advertising,” is the practice
of sharing consumer information with a third-party advertising
network or service so as to serve that consumer with adver-
tisements tailored to their interests.168 One of the easiest ways
to tailor advertising to an individual is to create advertise-
ments geared to their gender, although this can sometimes
backfire.169 Under European privacy law, consumers must give
prior consent in order for electronic communications service
providers to share their information with third-party networks
and facilitate targeted advertising.170 Under U.S. law, targeted
advertising is largely governed by industry self-regulation.171
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”); see also Ab-
bas, supra note 1644, at 267 (“When a company retains data for litigation,
EU law requires that the data subject explicitly consent to that use because
this type of preservation is deemed ‘further processing’ that is conducted for a
purpose unrelated to the reasons the data were originally collected.”).
167. Kristen A. Knapp, Enforcement of U.S. Electronic Discovery Law
Against Foreign Companies: Should U.S. Courts Give Effect to the EU Data
Protection Directive? 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 111, 125–26 (2010) (attrib-
uting the “conservative” discovery regime in Europe to the position of privacy
as a fundamental human right under the Charter); Carla Reyes, The U.S.
Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing A Three-Tiered Com-
pliance Strategy, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 357, 362 (2009). (“[G]iven the
general distaste in civil legal systems for U.S. discovery procedures, it is only
natural that in an area viewed as a fundamental human right, such as data
privacy, the conflict would increasingly grow.”).
168. Guide for Complying with DMA’s OBA Guidelines, DIRECT MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, http://www.dmaresponsibility.org/privacy/oba.shtml (last visit-
ed May 22, 2015).
169. Natasha Singer, E-Tailer Customization: Convenient or Creepy?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/technology/e-
tailer-customization-whats-convenient-and-whats-just-plain-creepy.html.
170. Council Directive 2009/136, art. 2(6), 2009 O.J. (L337) 11, 30–31.
171. AM. ASS’N OF ADVERT. AGENCIES ET. AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 15–16 (2009),
http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf (providing an ex-
ample of the U.S. atmosphere of self-regulation). This self-regulation depends
on the principles of consumer “notice and choice.” FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 27 (2012),
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. While the Federal Trade
Commission also enforces laws concerning unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent
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Yet this type of difference collapses somewhat when it comes to
the debate over regulating children’s privacy online. Both the
European and American systems emphasize parental notice
and consent for certain online activities.172 Specifically, both
have evinced particular concern with children’s school data.173
In both systems, it is taken for granted that children deserve
additional, special protections from intrusion online.
Policymakers often conceive of these differences in commer-
cial regulation as extremely value-laden. In Congressional
hearings about online privacy, advocates of self-regulation con-
sistently resort to the view that European privacy law is com-
pletely divergent from American privacy law.174 In 2011, Rep-
resentative Pete Olson stated,
Our friends in the European Union believe that privacy is a
fundamental human right and that government should be
tasked with protecting and regulating personal data. . . . [T]he
last thing we need to do is look toward Europe for guidance
for new privacy regulations. Instead, we should use today’s
hearing to look at how the EU’s overburdensome privacy laws
have negatively affected the European Union economy and
how we can avoid similar pitfalls.175
trade practices, its enforcement is largely focused on ensuring that consum-
ers may “make decisions about their data at a relevant time and context,” not
on preventing advertisers from collecting that data. Id. at i.
172. E.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act § 1303, 15 U.S.C. § 6502
(1998) (emphasizing parental consent for online activities for children under
13); Eur. Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor, “European Strategy for a Better Internet for Children,” at 6
(July 17, 2012),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consult
ation/Opinions/2012/12-07-17_Better_Iternet_Children_EN.pdf.
173. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Opinion 2/2009 on
the Protection of Children’s Personal Data (General Guidelines and the Spe-
cial Case of Schools), 398/09/EN (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp160_en.pdf;
Valerie Strauss, How Some School ‘Data Walls’ Violate U.S. Privacy Law,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/wp/2014/02/21/how-some-school-data-walls-violate-u-s-privacy-law/.
174. See, e.g., Internet Privacy: The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation:
Hearing Before The Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of
the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 7 (2011).
175. Id. (statement of Rep. Olson, Member, H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce).
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For obvious reasons, advocates of more transatlantic coopera-
tion take the opposite tack. In 2001, the then-chairman of the
EU Data Protection Working Party testified before Congress
that the differences between EU and U.S. privacy law did not
render the systems “mutually opposed or absolutely irreconcil-
able.”176 Rather, he argued that the EU data protection law left
more room for self-regulation, especially through contract. In
the same hearing, however, the chairman of the committee re-
sorted to the same familiar argument about incompatibility.177
The U.S. and EU Member States approach the issue of priva-
cy from different perspectives. Europeans are instilled with
the belief that privacy is a fundamental human right. There
are a number of reasons for this belief, including the vast and
traumatic experiences of the Nazi regime during the 1940’s.
Another reason for this perspective is the simple fact that
many EU countries are relatively new democracies. It was not
long ago that Kings and Queens ruled throughout Europe. In
the U.S., we take a different approach towards privacy as we
have fundamental protections to free expression provided in
the U.S. Constitution, including the First Amendment.178
Advocates of self-regulation often additionally rely on argu-
ments about American legal culture in order to explain why the
European model is inappropriate in the United States. The
“American tradition” of “personal responsibility” counsels
against binding privacy legislation because users should pro-
tect their own privacy.179 Similarly, “opt-in” consent mecha-
nisms, as required under European law, seem to violate the
First Amendment.180
176. The EU Data Protection Directive: Implications for the U.S. Privacy
Debate: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 12 (2001)
(statement of Stefano Rodotà, Chairman, EU Data Protection Working Par-
ty).
177. Id. at 5.
178. Id.
179. Adam Thierer, The Problem with Obama’s ‘Let’s Be More Like Europe’
Privacy Plan, FORBES, Feb. 23, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/02/23/the-problem-with-
obamas-lets-be-more-like-europe-privacy-plan/.
180. U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999) (striking
down an FCC regulation that required opt-in consent to share some customer
information for marketing purposes on the basis that it was insufficiently
narrowly tailored); Need for Internet Privacy Legislation: Hearing before the
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While questions linger about the substance of these argu-
ments, they are noted here because they illustrate that when it
comes to privacy, the belief that the two legal systems are in-
compatible has currency in the community of policymakers as
well as scholars. Yet both communities seem to uncritically ac-
cept the notion that privacy law governing corporate enterpris-
es is divergent because the two regimes are rooted in different
principles and traditions that treat the concept of privacy dif-
ferently. Neither seems to appreciate that the right to privacy
in both systems was conceptualized with something very differ-
ent in mind.
B. Comparative and Foreign Law in the Courts
Understanding the common, gendered roots of privacy can
minimize conflict over the deployment of “foreign” legal con-
cepts in constitutional adjudication. The citation of foreign law
in U.S. Supreme Court opinions has invited criticism from
scholars, policymakers, and Justices alike. In Lawrence v. Tex-
as, Justice Kennedy cited a European Court of Human Rights
case for the proposition that “Western civilization” recognized a
right to engage in consensual homosexual conduct.181 In dis-
sent, Justice Scalia argued that the majority was not only cher-
ry-picking its authority, but that decisions by “foreign nations”
were irrelevant and “dangerous dicta.”182 Lawrence provoked
backlash from the House of Representatives, where Repre-
sentative Tom Feeney introduced a resolution that
judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the Consti-
tution of the United States should not be based in whole or in
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign insti-
tutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments inform an understanding of the original meaning of the
Constitution of the United States.183
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. 26 (2001)
(testimony of Fred H. Cate, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law) (suggesting that U.S. West requires that opt-in consent requirements
can only exist where opt-out requirements have been previously judged insuf-
ficient).
181. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
182. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
183. Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568,
108th Cong. (2004).
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Additionally, dozens of states have considered measures that
would restrict judges from looking to foreign law generally or
Shari’a (Islamic law) in particular.184
Despite the reluctance to fully embrace European law as per-
suasive vis-à-vis U.S. rights, there has long been an under-
standing that Europe and the United States have some things
in common, particularly when it comes to law on gender, sexual
orientation, and human rights. Justice Ginsburg recently noted
that the briefs for Reed v. Reed, an Equal Protection challenge
to a preference for male estate administrators, had cited two
West German Constitutional Court decisions related to gender
equality.185 Justice Ginsburg, who litigated the case, explained
that she had included them for “psychological effect,” suggest-
ing, “If this is where the West German Constitutional Court is,
how far behind can the United States Supreme Court be?” 186
As Jack Balkin puts it, “The rejection of some foreign constitu-
tional law (as opposed to foreign law treated as part of our tra-
ditions) is based on a construction of most of the rest of the
world as other or as ‘not us.’”187
In the area of constitutional privacy rights—the basis for the
Lawrence decision—the perception that European and U.S.
traditions are incompatible and “not us” is particularly trou-
bling, as it seems to turn a blind eye to this common tradition.
While this should not dictate that courts adjudicating rights
across the Atlantic Ocean should reach the same substantive
results, it certainly should not mean that courts are prohibited
from looking across the transatlantic divide for counsel. An ex-
ample from the opposite vantage point: in a 1975 case known
as Abortion I, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court struck
down an abortion law that would have legalized abortion if per-
formed by a licensed physician within the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy.188 “Pregnancy belongs to the intimate sphere of the
184. See Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all.
185. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gillian Metzger & Abbe Gluck, A Conversation
With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 6, 24 (2013).
186. Id.
187. Jack M. Balkin, The American Constitution as “Our Law,” 25 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 113, 118 (2013).
188. ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] [Fed-
eral Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, 1975 (Ger.), availa-
ble at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv039001.html.
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woman that is constitutionally protected by Article 2(1) in con-
junction with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law,” the Court wrote.
However, the woman’s right “freely to develop her personality”
is limited by the “protected legal sphere of another”—in this
case, the fetus.189 The Court concluded that “the decision must
come down in favor of the preeminence of protecting the fetus’s
life over the right of self-determination of the pregnant wom-
an.”190
In Abortion I, the Court explicitly considered and rejected the
framework that the U.S. Supreme Court had adopted in Roe v.
Wade, finding that this went “too far” for German constitution-
al law to accept.191 This result was based on the Court’s finding
that the drafters of the Basic Law largely understood the right
to life in Article 2(2) to include fetal life.192 Article 2(2) itself,
they went on, had to be understood in light of Germany’s
unique experience under National Socialism, which treated
human life as a tool to be used by the state.193 The fact that
other Western countries had more “liberal” (albeit controver-
sial) abortion laws was not relevant, given this constitutional
background.194
Against objections that the citation of foreign authority is a
tool to “advance[e] a politically progressive agenda otherwise
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 216.
192. See generally id.
193. Id. at 201–03 (“Dem Grundgesetz liegen Prinzipien der Staatsgestal-
tung zugrunde, die sich nur aus der geschichtlichen Erfahrung und der geis-
tig-sittlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem vorangegangenen System des
Nationalsozialismus erklären lassen.”) (trans.: “The Basic Law is undergird-
ed by principles of state design that can only be explained by historical expe-
rience and the spiritual and moral confrontation with the preceding system of
National Socialism.”).
194. Id. at 203 (“Gegenüber der Allmacht des totalitären Staates, der
schrankenlose Herrschaft über alle Bereiche des sozialen Lebens für sich
beanspruchte und dem bei der Verfolgung seiner Staatsziele die Rücksicht
auch auf das Leben des Einzelnen grundsätzlich nichts bedeutete, hat das
Grundgesetz eine wertgebundene Ordnung aufgerichtet, die den einzelnen
Menschen und seine Würde in den Mittelpunkt aller seiner Regelungen
stellt.”) (trans.: “Compared to the omnipotence of the totalitarian state, which
exercised unlimited control over all aspects of social life and to which the
lives of individuals meant nothing in its pursuit of its state goals, the Basic
Law has established a value-oriented regime in which individual people and
their dignity stand at the center of all its laws.”).
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blocked by democratic majoritarianism,” the Abortion I decision
suggests that there are very fruitful ways of engaging with per-
suasive foreign authority, while maintaining a unique constitu-
tional culture and fidelity to domestic values.195 Where consti-
tutional rights stem from a common tradition, it is unwise to
“emphasize differences where there appear to be none.” 196
While it is obviously not the case that there are no differences
between U.S. and European privacy protections, the differences
between the privacy rights have been largely overstated.
C. Law Enforcement Cooperation
Finally, recognition that the EU and U.S. approaches to the
right to privacy are grounded in a common concern about fami-
ly life, sex, and marriage might reduce friction over transatlan-
tic initiatives to combat crime and terrorism. These issues
come to the forefront regarding surveillance of terror suspects.
The concern regarding perceived differences between European
and American law has been of special significance when it
comes to transatlantic data sharing. In the immediate after-
math of the September 11 attacks, the Central Intelligence
Agency and Treasury Department subpoenaed thousands of
records from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Transactions (“SWIFT”).197 SWIFT is a Belgian banking con-
sortium and is therefore subject to European law, but the data
SWIFT provided came from its American servers.198 After the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (“TFTP”), was made pub-
lic in 2006, the backlash from European data protection au-
thorities was tremendous.199 The Belgian data protection au-
195. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POL’Y
REV. 33, 44 (2005).
196. Sujit Choudhry, Living Originalism In India? “Our Law”and Compar-
ative Constitutional Law, 25 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 1, 4 (2013).
197. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Se-
cret to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html.
198. Commission de la Protection de la Vie Privée [Belgian Data Protection
Authority], Avis relatif à la transmission de données à caractère personnel par
la SCRL SWIFT suite aux sommations de l’UST [Opinion on the Transfer of
Personal Data by the CSLR SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC) Subpoenas],
SA2 / A / 2006 / 035, at 21 (Sept. 27, 2006), unofficial translation available at
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2644.pdf.
199. See, e.g., id.; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Opinion
10/2006 on the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide In-
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thority concluded that SWIFT had violated European data pro-
tection law, and the European Parliament voted down a deal to
allow the data sharing to continue.200
In response to concerns about privacy intrusions a redrafted
bill, passed by the European Parliament a few months later,
included several redress mechanisms.201 Under the new TFTP,
Europol, the European police organization, must “verify” U.S.
requests for information issued to EU-based banks. Additional-
ly, the new agreement imposes a number of new safeguards,
including narrow tailoring of the requests.202 Yet in reviewing
the activities conducted under the agreement, Europol’s Joint
Supervisory Body concluded that US requests were “abstract,”
“broad,” and “impossible” to verify.203
One potential reason that the TFTP continues to exist, de-
spite its probable incompliance with European data protection
law, is that the agreement may actually have little to do with
the principles undergirding the right to privacy in European
law. Indeed, part of the compromise that allowed the TFTP to
move forward was that the United States would help the Euro-
peans develop their own terrorist finance tracking system.204
Objections to counterterrorism cooperation thus seem to reflect
terbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), 01935/06/EN, 21 (2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp128_en.pdf.
200. EUR. PARL. DOC. A7-0013, at 7 (2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2010-0013+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (arguing
that European law required a warrant or court order to obtain financial rec-
ords).
201. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Europe-
an Union on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from
the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program, U.S.-E.U., June 28, 2010,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-
Finance-Tracking/Documents/Final-TFTP-Agreement-Signed.pdf.
202. Id. art. 4.
203. EUROPOL JOINT SUPERVISORY BODY, REPORT NO. JSB/INS. 11-07, REPORT
ON THE INSPECTION OF EUROPOL’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TFTP AGREEMENT 5
(2011),
http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/media/111009/terrorist%20finance%20t
racking%20program%20(tftp)%20inspection%20report%20-
%20public%20version.pdf.
204. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN TERRORIST FINANCING
TRACKING PROGRAMME ROADMAP 2 (2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_home_003_terro
rist_financing_tracking_en.pdf.
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transatlantic competition and spite, not principled differences
between the right to privacy under the two regimes. We can
reconcile this seeming contradiction by recalling that the right
to privacy as understood in Europe has more in common with
the American tradition than is usually recognized. Financial
information is perhaps simply not that sensitive.
Concerns for privacy have markedly increased in light of re-
cent disclosures about National Security Agency (“NSA”) wire-
tapping. In fact, it is in this area that concern about govern-
ment intrusion on “private life” is most prevalent. In initial
coverage of the NSA wiretapping program, which collected te-
lephony “metadata” on hundreds of millions of Americans, dis-
cussion swirled around the meaning of “metadata” and its po-
tential for intrusion. Much of the coverage focused on the inap-
propriateness of government surveillance of private life. For
example, a recent article about metadata surveillance focused
on the revelatory nature of the information at issue:
[T]he government knows when we’ve called a rape hotline, a
domestic violence hotline, an addiction hotline, or a support
line for gay teens. . . . If, for instance, the government knows
that, within an hour, we called an HIV testing service, then
our doctor, and then our health insurance company, they may
not ‘know’ what was discussed, but anyone with common
sense—even a government official—could probably figure it
out.205
Recent coverage of “leaky apps,” mobile applications that share
user information, has critiqued these applications’ disclosure of
“users’ most sensitive information such as sexual orientation—
and one app recorded in the material even sends specific sexual
preferences such as whether or not the user may be a swing-
er.” 206 Although the technology of surveillance may have
changed substantially, it appears that European and American
definitions of what is “private” are largely similar.
205. Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Taking the “Meh” Out of Metadata,
SLATE (Nov. 22, 2013, 12:07 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/nsa_a
nd_metadata_how_the_government_can_spy_on_your_health_political_belief
s.html.
206. James Ball, Angry Birds and ‘Leaky’ Phone Apps Targeted by NSA and
GCHQ for User Data, GUARDIAN, Jan. 28, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-
angry-birds-personal-data.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, these revelations have prompted
even more of a backlash in Europe, including serious proposals
of building a “European internet” so that European citizens
would not have to “send emails and other information across
the Atlantic.”207 Yet even here, the reasons for this reaction are
misconstrued as based on “[t]he country’s experience with the
Nazi and east German Stasi secret police, which recruited vast
networks of informers.”208 While the role of new technology is
discussed both repeatedly and at length, questioning of the
reasoning and motives for protecting “private life” is conspicu-
ously absent.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that contemporary accounts of
European privacy law are historically, analytically, and de-
scriptively overstated. The roots of contemporary privacy pro-
tection in Europe are not simply about one’s right to control
information, but rather about a particular type of control—a
man’s right to control his family life. That no straight line can
be drawn from the original drafting of privacy protections to
today’s regulatory setting should be obvious: legal protections
change and evolve with time. Yet time and again, policy-
makers and scholars rely on the exceptional historical back-
ground of European privacy law as a rationale for intransi-
gence, uncooperativeness, and even spite. While new technolo-
gies have undoubtedly complicated informational privacy be-
cause they have made it easier to collect, store, and use infor-
mation,209 current scholarship has failed to consider in depth
the reasons why we consider certain information to be “private”
in the first place. However, the twenty-first century protections
of information privacy are themselves inextricably linked to
non-informational privacy—to a concept of “private life” that
arose in a setting we, today, feel uncomfortable in. As with the
American edition of Goebbels’s novel, which conveniently left
out the title’s reference to “German destiny,” the story of Euro-
207. Jeevan Vasagar & James Fontanella-Khan, Angela Merkel Backs
EU Internet to Deter US Spying, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014.
208. Stevan Wagstyl & James Fontanella-Khan, Germany Struggles to Re-
spond to NSA Revelations, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2013.
209. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV.
477, 483 (2006) (“New technologies have given rise to a panoply of different
privacy problems.”).
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pean privacy law is missing a subtitle that, in retrospect, turns
out to be quite significant.
